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Articles
Marcus Faro de Castro' Beyond Liberalism and Its Critics:
An Essay in Constitutional Theory
Introduction
Contemporary legal culture spends a great deal of energy in generating
arguments about constitutional law. Typically, such arguments concern the
determination of the content of constitutional clauses which define the
meaning and extension of governmental powers, individual rights and civil
liberties, the allocations of power among different departments of govern-
ment, or among local and supra-local spheres of government, and so forth.
Needless to say, it is interesting and necessary to debate questions of
constitutional law. However, it seems that those discussions canbe enriched
and enlarged with considerations coming from a different perspective: that
of constitutional theory.
Constitutional law proper (i.e., constitutional law in the narrow sense of
"the science of constitutional law") developedin the nineteenth century,and
thus largely as a product of legal positivism. Before the emergence of
constitutional law in this narrow sense, there was only constitutional (or
political) theory, which has come down to us from Plato and Aristotle.
Therefore, constitutional theory precedes constitutional law and is coeval
with, and germane to, philosophy. By the same token, it has intricate
attachments to religious motives.3 Thus, by its origin and development in
close ties with the traditions of both philosophy (metaphysics) and theology,
political or constitutional theory, which for many centuries existed in lieu of
constitutional law, was, until Hegel at least, a style of argument rich in
substantive content, which was supposed to correspond to the content of
politics itself.
However, during the many centuries in which constitutional theory
existed instead of constitutional law in the narrow sense, there was no
1. Researcher and lecturer on Government at the Universidade de Brasilia, Brazil; LL.M.
Harvard Law School (1986); S.J.D., Harvard Law School (1990).
2. Cf. M. Galizia, "Profili storico-comparativi delta scienza del diritto costituzionale", in 33
Archivio Giuridico 'Filippo Serafini' 3-110, sixth series, [vol. 164 of the whole collection]
(1963).
3. For suggestions on relevant connections between theological and philosophical themes, see
generally, H. Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, (Cambridge: M1T Press, 1983);
as to the connections between modem constitutional theory and theological debate, see Q.
Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1978) at 114-123.
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such complex of institutional practices as that which became the typical
political foundation of modem Western societies, under the name of "rule
of law". In this new institutional environment, constitutional law gradu-
ally took the fore and became the staple of higher magistracies, including
constitutional courts. As a consequence, judges have characteristically
become accustomed to think that in interpreting the constitution they are
dealing with abstract considerations distinct from the content of crude
politics, and from the multiple and intractable substantive motivations
which it incorporates.
It can be said, therefore, that the development of constitutional law in
the narrow sense, together with the habits of thought and social and
political practices which it helped to sustain, overshadowed the relevance
and the richness of themes pertinent to constitutional theory, while
weakening or suppressing the connections between the one and the other,
as between law and politics. Under the rule of law, legal doctrine tends
to become quite artificially separated from political and ideological
debate, which is thrown to the feared rage of political parties. In this sense,
it is ironical but also telling that only where constitutional review has long
been understood and cultivated as an essentially political instrument does
there seem to have developed some possibility that the discussions in the
field of constitutional law be expanded so as to include political themes,
though not necessarily for the benefit of theory.4
This essay is an effort to explore the connections between constitu-
tional law and constitutional theory. It is not an attempt to develop a
theory. Rather, it is an endeavor to show that constitutional law can
neither be meaningful nor useful without reference to notions understood
and experienced as politics, that is, notions which can be viewed as the
political foundations of constitutional doctrine in the context of an
enlarged intellectual perspective. Such perspective is afforded by an
understanding of pertinent themes in neighboring theorical fields, which
can be profitably explored for the present purposes.
Indeed, besides political theory, at least two other intellectual tradi-
tions have, since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, focused upon
the political dimension of social experience. Each has in its own way
attempted to throw new light on the essential foundations of modem
social intercourse. They are the traditions of social theory andof political
economy. It makes sense therefore to resort to discussions in those fields
4. It is thus concededly due to the Marshallian tradition of constitutional review in the United
States that nominations to the American Supreme Court have tended to become hot political
issues. See, e.g., the legal-political discussions contained in the pieces published in (1987) 9
Cardozo Law Review concerning the proposed nomination of Robert Bork to that court.
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in order to articulate a broad view of the political foundations of
contemporary constitutional doctrine.'
The argument presented below rests on certain basic assumptions,
which can be summarized as follows. First, there is the idea that the
political essence of society, understood as a body of unsteady substantive
motivations - constitutive of politics, but often vicariously identified
with "reason" and "nature" - underlies and sustains all collective im-
pulses to defy, through moral and material progress, both historically
established practices and natural constraints. Moreover, there is the claim
that, since the liberal revolutions, and throughout the socialist critical
responses to them, the political essence of society has been repeatedly
though imperfectly removed from the horizon of theoretical debate. This
will be called the "denial of political essence". The idea is that the denial
of political essence was a process accomplished by liberalism, as well as
by its critics from right and left.
Second, there is the notion that such persistent denial of political
essence has caused contemporary social and political practices to curtail
the possibility of sustaining continuous self-conscious defiance of his-
tory and nature. Since self-conscious defiance of history and nature
begets emancipation of the self, the denial of political essence is equiva-
lent to deception of the self by itself, which can be termed "self-
deception."
Hence the third point: the need for the formulation of the challenge of
contemporary constitutional theory. This challenge can be understood as
that of devising institutions which venture beyond liberalism and its
critics. Such institutions must be capable of reinstating the political
essence of society, without favoring totalitarianism (as occurred under
socialism) nor constraining possible chances of present or future transfor-
mation of the ground rules of social life.
This essay inquires about the denial of political essence, characterized
in general terms as self-deception (Part I). Such denial is also sought in
specific renderings, that is, in available doctrinal and practical develop-
ments, namely, in jurisprudential notions complemented chiefly by
theoretical and policy achievements in the field of political economy. It
is suggested that in some aspects of these developments, specifically in
5. An alternative strategy would be to resort to the tradition of classical political theory itself,
as has been recently done by many authors, who have revived the theme of Aristotelian
republicanism in order to discuss constitutional law. See, e.g., F. Michelman, "The Supreme
Court 1985 Term -Foreword: Traces of Self-Government" (1986), 100 Harvard Law Review
1. However, the classical tradition arguably overlooks important developments, which can be
conveniently dubbed into "the problem of modernity," which is inquired into in the more recent
traditions of political economy and social theory. On the "problem ofmodernity", see R. Unger,
Law in Modern Society, (New York: Free Press, 1976) at 37-40*
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State-centered Marxist studies, in Weberian social science and in
Keynesian economics, the seeds are already sown for the reinstatement
of the political essence of society (Part I). It is furthermore argued that
the constitutional tensions resulting from the growth of administration,
insofar as the latter was made dependent on Keynesian economic poli-
cies, are indicative of a paradigm shift from liberal (or English-style)
constitutionalism to what can be described as a "new constitutionalism"
(Part III). Finally, an effort is made to derive from the exercise an
understanding of the challenge of contemporary constitutional theory. It
will be suggested that an acceptable response to such challenge must
include the "legal derivation" of monetary policy under conditions of
reinstatement of the political essence of society. (Part IV).
Part I
1. Political Essence, Political Form and Self-Deception
The rationality of the order of society has been an ideal continuously
entertained in the Western tradition of political and social thought. A
recurrent difficult point, however, has been that of telling reason from
myth,6 that is to say, reason from unreason. Such difficulty occurs
whenever a set of criteria for the justification of a particular social order
is formulated and is attributed a rational and tendentially unchallengeable
status. Starting clearly at least since Plato's dialogues (which convey the
debate of rationalism against both the sophists and traditional morality),
the tensions which are expressed in the ambiguous relationship between
reason and unreason become subsequently present throughout proposed
categories of rational thought in general,7 and yield the aporias which
accompany them.
In so far as they are regarded as differentiated from myth, modern
rational ideas arerelated to all enacted rational practices andprocesses of
innovation of society and culture. However, such ideas, and the practices
to which they correspond, are still always (as they were in the time of
Socrates and Plato) elaborated and acted out with their in-built conceptual
tensions and practical conditions of conflictual confrontation. This im-
parts to such ideas and practices an ambiguous character as to their
aspired ideal or practical rationality.
6. Cf. M. Horkheimer & T. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (New York: Continuum,
1989) 3-42.
7. It suffices to think of the implicit or explicit coexistence within offered theoretical
frameworks of such concepts and experiences which can be broadly designated by form and
substance, truth and faith, universal and singular, reality and appearance, mind and body, being
and nothingness, subject and object, theory and practice, self and other, etc.
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There are some of such ambiguities and opportunities of conflict that
have negligible impact upon the way in which the general economy
functions, the way in which the society is politically organized, or the
endurance of beliefs and understandings that inform the present structure
of a given culture and the objective conduct of social actors. Such lower-
impact ambiguities and opportunities of conflict are in due time resolved
or forgotten and are discarded as error or unreasonable thought, and
impossible or impermissible courses of action.
There are, however, higher-impact ambiguities and opportunities of
conflictual confrontation, such as those which in ancient Greece charac-
terized the debate between rationalism on the one hand and sophistry and
(religious) tradition on the other, and which became the sparkle of what
has been in many contexts characterized as "legitimation crisis".' Such
ambiguities and opportunities of conflict may be briskly diffused into the
cultural and material conditions of existence, incorporate novel elements
into current practices, and swiftly change the structure of imagination and
conduct of social and political actors.
Higher-impact ambiguities and opportunities of conflict are today
those controversial points debated and fought over by social actors and
lawyers, philosophers and scientists, in the form of clashing hypotheses
about truth, taste and rightful action or method. They can, however,
seldom be precisely rendered into a stable conception, doctrine, theory,
or set of methodological procedures, because their distinct practical
implications, conceptual identity, and cultural significance can only be
determined after their actual exploration, simultaneously linking and
modifying thought and practical reality, has, for some reason (or unrea-
son?), ceased.
Yet, although they cannot be precisely determined for a large expanse
of time, many of such higher-impact ambiguities and opportunities of
conflict have always been, for limited historical durations, selectively
removed from the procedures of cultural production,9 and from the
courses of action generally available to the members of the society. Such
subtracted ambiguities and opportunities of conflict were previously the
taboos and other irrational norms and practices. Today they are decisions
stabilized as counterpoints to knowledge and technology produced under
certain cultural, professional and scientific standards of acceptability said
8. On this point, see the discussion of C. Taylor, "Legitimation Crisis?", in C. Taylor,
Philosophy and the Human Sciences - Philosophical Papers 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985) at 248-288.
9. As occurs, for example, under the paradigmatic structures of normal science. On the concept
of changing paradigms of scientific knowledge, see T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970).
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to be rational. It is interesting to note also that a great number of such
decisions are today first formulated as, or conditioned by, legal norms
(which include legislative, administrative and judicial rules, comple-
mented by scholarly writing, as the expression of standing policies,
commands or rights), themselves characteristically aspiring to a recog-
nized status of rationality. The subtraction, by whatever means, of
higher-impact ambiguities and opportunities of conflict from the proce-
dures of cultural production and societal interaction can be called
normative differentiation.
It can thus be said that normative differentiation in modem and pre-
modem politics turns on the determination or more or less stable and
exclusive criteria of permissible action, and of imaginative construction
of ideals, beliefs, concepts and all other cultural artifacts. Once they are
appropriated as more or less exclusive and stable means of determination
of permissible present and future imagination and conduct, such criteria
become the acknowledged instruments of power-they become, in other
words, the objective form of the political essence of society.
The legal institutions (or legal-constitutional frameworks) of modem
Western societies are perhaps the most sophisticated and comprehensive
examples of current devices through which higher-impact ambiguities
and opportunities of cQnflict are selectively removed from the processes
of cultural production and practical societal intercourse. Indeed, such
legal systems, in both their theoretical (jurisprudential) and practical
(professional and official-bureaucratic) dimensions, are perhaps what
most tangibly and comprehensively incorporates today the objective
form of the political essence of modem Western societies.
By means of the enactment and more or less continuous administration
of such legal systems (the modem legal-constitutional frameworks and
their attachments to bodies of international law), an unprecedented
measure of moral and above all material progress has been attained in the
contemporary world. However, this spectacular advancement of human
capabilities came only at the cost of confining the chances and resources
for the promotion of general historical innovation to very restricted
avenues and directions of change; namely, those pursued by certain
favored and legally defined economic and political actors (property
owners, corporations, trade unions, governmental bureaucracies), who
jointly exercise the mastery over the subtraction of ambiguities and
opportunities of conflict from the procedures of cultural production and
societal interaction, democratic legitimation notwithstanding. 10 In other
words, due to the operation of the legal system, the political essence of
10. See infra, note 11.
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society remains unavailable to self-conscious practical intervention by
ordinary individuals engaged in ordinary social practices. They can not
self-consciously influence, through their daily, ordinary activities, the
broadening and/or redirection of the avenues of historical and material
progress. This generates a situation of alienation of ordinary individuals
from the political essence of society, which is translated into general
moral and material oppression and decadence - the moral and material
inability of the whole collectivity to even more thoroughly defy history
and nature.
Such legally constructed alienation from the political essence of
society, which translates into the confinement of collective chances and
resources of social transformation, leads to what appears to be the central
quandary of modem politics, which can be formulated as follows. On the
one hand, the broadening or redirection of the avenues of historical and
material change appears to require continuous emancipation from natural
and moral oppression through extensive restoration, into the existing
procedures of cultural production and societal interaction, of currently
subtracted ambiguities and opportunities of conflict; episodic elections
alone having proven insufficient to radically redefine the avenues and the
direction of change.' I On the other hand, the restoration of such ambigu-
ities and opportunities of conflict implies the proportional cancellation of
normative differentiation, which exists only when certain ambiguities
and opportunities of conflict are temporarily, but resolutely, subtracted
from cultural production and societal intercourse occurring at present, in
the shape of extant institutions.
This is why in modem society, where myth has been allegedly
overcome for the sake of reason, unreason reappears not only as the
nourishment of all forms of hope and despair, but also as the basis of all
truly political imagination and calculi of the possibilities of innovation
and material progress. If one form of unreason has become the modem
mind's neurotic bent,12 another has become simply the often politically
disfavored - because creative and emancipatory - idea or practical
initiative 3 from which higher-impact ambiguities and opportunities of
conflict might develop. "Reason" has therefore come to constitute the
basis of self-deception, as unreason became the foil of emancipation from
natural fate and moral oppression. Thus self-deception became (through
reason) a characteristic of modem political rationality only because
11. On the relative ineffectiveness of elections regarding possibilities of redefinition of the
avenues and directions of historical change in Western industrial democracies, see A.
Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, (Cambridge/Paris: Cambridge University
Press/Editions de Ta Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1986) at 99-132.
12. Cf. T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, (New York: Continuum, 1973) at 297-298.
13. Or action stemming from virtal, as Machiavelli would have it. See Niccolb Machiavelli,
II Principe, (Milano: Aldo Garzanti. 1976) at 28-3 1.
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emancipation has become (through unreason) a real, objective possibil-
ity. In short, unreason became the path to the suppressed political essence
of society as well as to the expansion of the possibilities of emancipation
from natural and historical constraints.
This theme can be developed in the account, offered below, of early
liberal normative differentiation and institutions, and of the criticisms
they have been subjected to by more recent theoretical developments and
practical initiatives. Such account is relevant for the characterization of
the challenge of contemporary constitutional theory.
Part E[
1. The Early Liberal Legacy as the Denial of Political Essence
The modes of determination of norms have not been unchanged in the
history of Western societies. In pre-modern societies normative differen-
tiation was objectively (publicly and collectively) entangled with myth.
As suggested above, the objective entanglement with myth yielded a
normatively differentiated structure of institutions. Such structure ex-
pressed necessarily the objective form of the political experience of the
community.1 4 The development and bureaucratic (translocal, central-
ized) organization of a religious tradition 5 which combined monotheism,
prophetic revelation, and eschatological and soteriological perspectives
of human existence was a specific rendering of such entanglement of
normative differentiation and myth. The definitive disentanglement of
normative differentiation from myth occurs when rational politics based
on emancipatory legal institutions becomes an ideal as well as a practical
possibility and enacted action.
Indeed, modern historical events have set in motion cultural and
practical initiatives which have displaced the dominance of medieval
moral theology and associated political experiences as the forces and
procedures controlling normative differentiation in the West. Such
initiatives forming relatively diversified but historically interrelated
aggregates of experiments in thought and action can be broadly termed
"liberal revolutions". In their extended meaning, liberal revolutions
include not only the overthrow of ancient or sacred privilege, but also a
change in the conception and mode of achievement of normative
differentiation.
14. Such objective form corresponded to the political machinery in use. For an anthropologi-
cal description, seeM. Gluckman,Politics,Law andRitual in TribalSociety, (New York: New
American Library, 1965).
15. Cf. H. Berman, Law andRevolution, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983) at 88-
94.
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Prior to the liberal revolutions, normative differentiation always
necessitated objective entanglement with unreason. 16 To such objective
entanglement corresponded the institutions of theocratic rule and of
natural economy. 7 Under conditions of theocratic rule and natural
economy, objectivity of institutions took ordinarily the form of ritualized
conduct, and normative differentiation was, at crucial junctures, sanc-
tioned by a priesthood or other proclaimers and administrators of mystery
and revealed dogma. An alternative mode of determination of political
rationality was the subjective and passive appeal to a demythologyzed
conception of nature. This alternative, however, led only to skeptical
surrender to emergent historical circumstances, which were attributed to
natural fate, as in the detached hostility of stoicists to engagement in
political activism or resistance. 8
Since the liberal revolutions, however, objectivity of institutions
became independent from publicly ritualized conduct. Indeed, the liberal
mode of normative differentiation required that the subtractions of
ambiguities and opportunities of conflict become, in essential aspects,
affirmative subjective events. 9 By shifting the processes of normative
differentiation from publicly ritualized conduct or inward fateful resig-
nation into innovative imagination and action flowing from private
normative differentiation, the liberal revolutions spurred a multiplication
of creative intellectual and practical initiatives (scientific, economic,
military and political) which combined to destroy once and for all the old
institutions and sustain the possibility of permanent cultural and material
progress. Such historical breakthrough occurred, as is well known,
originally in the West.20 Private normative differentiation, as a mode of
articulation of the political essence of society, can therefore be said to
constitute a requirement of modem political rationality.
16. Primarily through myth, and secondarily through the "non-scientific" and ancillary means
of prudential dialectics (as opposed to the "geometrical" method of natural law jurists), which
was the method of law from the Roman jurisconsults to the medieval Bartolists. Prudence is
non-scientific, in the sense that phronesis is opposed to episteme. On this latter point, cf. J.
Habermas, Theory and Practice, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973) at 42. On the role of scholastic
dialectics in early continental legal science, see H. Berman, supra, note 12, at 143-151.
17. The conception of "natural economy" and its relationship with modernization experi-
ments, possibilities of "reversal" to natural economy, imperatives of self-transformation and
"anti-reversion policies" are articulated in R. Unger, Plasticity into Power, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 8-96.
18. Cf. the remarks on Montaigne offered by Q. Skinner, supra, note 3, at 275-284.
19. For a discussion of this theme, see R. Unger, Knowledge and Politics, (New York: Free
Press, 1975) at 42-46, 76-81. See also M. Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, (New York:
Continuum, 1987) at 3-57.
20. It was what Unger termed "the European escape from the cycle ofreversion". See R. Unger
supra, note 17, at 25-42.
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However, once modem creative intellectual and practical initiatives
had accomplished the historical breakthrough which allowed modem
Western societies to increasingly secure themselves against the possibili-
ties of reversal to theocracy and'natural economy, practical and intellec-
tual strongholds were developed to fortify those recently created institu-
tions and intellectual paradigms whose rejection over time could further
promote continuing cultural and material progress and emancipation.
Arguments in favor of private normative differentiation have therefore
soon and repeatedly superimposed on that requirement of modem politics
the postulate that private subtractions of ambiguity and opportunities of
conflict, which are supposed to result in pemiissible outward thought and
action, had already yielded a relatively stable, unchanging - indeed,
tendentially universal and thus uncontroversial - structure of knowledge,
taste and practical righteousness. 2' In this, the need to resort to unsettling
substantive motivations constitutive of higher-impact ambiguities and
opportunities of conflict was dispensed with. Reality thus allegedly
became independent not only from objective unreason, as that of past
ritualized conduct, but also from subjective unreason-the acknowledged
possibility of privately generated normative instability, which could be
intentionally directed towards the reform of existing conceptions and
institutions. It is this liberal denial of self-criticism (which amounts to
liberal self-deception) that accounts for the denial of political essence in
modem constitutional experience.
Indeed the exercises in self-deception began as soon as a first round of
intellectual and practical innovations brought by the liberal revolutions
came to be interpreted as offering sufficient safeguards against a reversal
to theocracy and natural economy. The theories of classical political
economists and the practices advocated by them, together with the
theories and institutional practices of English constitutionalism, were
among the most influential of such exercises in self-deception. Both
traditions were able to rely on an imagined form of intercourse with
nature which, so they successfully recommended, must be attained
through creative, emancipatory private normative differentiation. This
took, on the one hand, the form of the moral (or legal) pursuit of claims
and actions associated with the rubric "natural right", and, on the other
hand, the form of the economic pursuit of claims and activities associated
with the classical economic theory of value. Such innovations thus
involved the creation of the modem constitutional government based on
"natural" rights, and of the market economy based on self-governed
practices of economic exchange that were independent from moral-
21. See infra, discussion on "natural right" and "absolute value".
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theocratic norms (such as the "just price" of scholastics) and from
mercantilist regulations.
To be sure, both the labor-cum-natural law theory of property' that
came in support of the English political settlement of 1688-89 - which
gave to the English constitution the foundations by which it became an
admired example of civil government- and the classical economic theory
of value had much in common.z3 If for nothing else, both ways of going
about normative differentiation relied on notions and correlative prac-
tices whose contradictory character was never made explicit at the time
they were formulated:
(a) the idea and practice of emancipatory thought and action occurring
through labour as private normative differentiation; and
(b) the notion that the objective result of such normative differentiation
corresponds to "natural" right, or to "absolute" real value.
Thus, to the Lockean argument that society must rest on private
appropriation of economic resources - through one's mixing of one's
labor with whatever is thereby "removed" out of the state of nature and
turned into claims constitutive of private property - corresponds the
classical economists' tacit derivation of the objective conditions of
societal intercourse (i.e., the "exchange value") from such conditions'
"labor cost", as measured according to some unchanging, natural or
absolute criterium equated with "real value".24 These are versions of the
very same central thought, namely that private normative differentiation
necessarily yields an objective structure of knowledge or righteousness
claims that is held to be inherently stable or acceptable and thus shielded
22. See J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government, chapter V (1690).
23. This argument draws on G. Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of
Economic Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, trans., 1965) at56 et seq. The notion
of "fundamental law", prominently cultivated by English jurists, but which Myrdal does not
address, must also be mentioned. In English legal tradition, up to the civil wars, emphasis had
been placed on ancient custom or constitution, which was brought in the defence of feudal
privilege against royal prerogative. But "the period following 1688 witnessed a transference
of emphasis from ancient custom and precedent to unhistorical reason", John G. A. Pocock, The
Ancient Constitution and the Feudal law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) at
229-251, 241. The notions of fundamental law and natural right therefore served the same
general political purpose.
24. Classical political economy provided a very problematic account of the objective socio-
economic order. As expressed by Myrdal, "[b]oth Smith and Ricardo define value in the first
place as exchange value. In the course of the explanation they smuggle in the theory of real
value without a thorough discussion of its nature", G. Myrdal, supra, note 23, at 61. Thus,
"classical writers ... presupposed an absolute real value in terms of which both magnitudes of
the ratio are expressed. An invarable measure of value implies an absolute, intrinsic value. This
entirely unempirical fiction underlies the whole classical system and pervades even its
otherwise sound arguments": ibid., at 66.
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from privately generated moral or political challenge.' Consequently,
this objective structure is also shielded from the possibility of explicit,
self-conscious revision and purposive historical demise. This central
conception of "natural" righteousness was also embraced in the European
continent by the philosophes, and was celebrated as the, foundation of
post-revolutionary civil government and social order.26
As an objective political experiment, the liberal mode of normative
differentiation, with the characteristic ramparts of self-deception bol-
stered by the notions referred to above (natural right and absolute real
value), successfully supported the attempt by political actors and thinkers
to suppress or reduce to practical meaninglessness the activities of
normative differentiation occurring in received objective institutions,
above all in the Roman Church, and in the latter's independent, Reforma-
tion-bred princely surrogates. This was done chiefly by means of the
elaboration and administration of modem legal-constitutional frame-
works.
The development of such frameworks, together with the elaboration of
the doctrines proposed by classical economic theory, supported the well-
known liberal recipe for the conduct of what were conceived as the means
of the rational organization of society. Thus the first round of intellectual
and practical innovations brought by the liberal revolutions produced
combinations of:
(a) constitutional governments, imagined as harmonious or equili-
brated political systems under which the society of governed was to
be quite naturally and quite flawlessly embodied in a few simple
institutions - typically, a demythologized monarchy subdued by a
complacent parliament committed to a self-reassuring credo of
natural righteousness;
(b) laissez-faire, as a result of the enforcement of the liberal ("natural")
constitutional rights;,
(c) minimal taxation (with no progressive taxes), and modic public
expenditure, including that for military purposes;
(d) free trade;
25. Although Locke refers both to revelation and natural reason it is to the latter that he turns
in order to justify individual property ("God, who hth given the world to men in common, hath
also given them reason to make use of it to the best of life and convenience"). Labour, the means
to appropriate nature, is what is truly rational and capable of yielding utility in natural resources
employed to the best of life and convenience.
26. See "Dclaration des Droits de Homme et du Citoyen du 26 aofit 1789", in Constitutions
et Documents Politiques, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966) at 3-4.
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(e) benevolent colonialism; and
(f) the gold standard."
These were the formal instruments which set the liberal societies in
motion. Such instruments allowed social groups to break away from the
theocratic-totalitarian yoke. Yet, as discussed above, by affirming through
their core doctrines (natural right and absolute real value) the attainment
of definitive truth in respect of the political foundations of the social
order, those instruments were also the means through which was accom-
plished the denial of the political essence of society. Such denial of
political essence became a source of constraint and oppression."
It goes without saying that such formal instruments resulted from
experiments in thought and action which could not have been pursued in
practice as the application of an accomplished and tightly knit theory or
set of policies. In other words, these instruments were experimental, as
much as any tentative enterprise of historical innovation. Therefore they
necessarily varied in their concrete embodiments, pace of accomplish-
ment, and in the extent of their failure or success, while promoting (or
constraining through self-deception) further experimentation and creative
initiatives in thought and action by the members of the societies that first
sailed in the winds of the liberal revolutions. And it was probably because
self-deceptive constraints impinged upon further experimentation that
criticisms of the early liberal legacy soon emerged.
2. Criticism from the Right
If the above indications can be accepted as a fair account of the early
liberal mode of normative differentiation and of its respective institu-
tional results, then the criticism of them, as offered by late-liberal and
postliberal intellectual traditions and practical initiatives, can be consid-
ered at this point. Such criticisms can be divided into three main bodies
of theories and correlate sets of institutional practices.
First there are the theories which accept that normative differentation
is private. But under such theories the importance of private normative
determinability is minimized by the argument that the unbiased, perfect
translation of private normative differentiation into externalized, objec-
27. The characteristic early liberal practices regarding laissez-faire, taxation, public expendi-
ture, international trade, colonial policies and the gold standard are stressed in J. Schumpeter,
History of Economic Analysis, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954) at 396-407.
Schumpeter describes these practices as elements of the sociopolitical background of the
period from 1790 to 1870, the period of economic liberalism.
28. The denial of political essence indeed often led to perverse obscurantism and to the defense
of vested interests, as stressed by M. Horkheimer, supra note 19, at 24-25.
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tive institutions is achieved if (and only if) positive scientific method
exclusively is employed in ascertaining and in building the order of
society.
These are claims upheld by positivist social science and jurisprudence,
from Bentham to Comte, to von Stein and beyond, and by neo-classical
economics.29 In this late-liberal, positivist line of criticism of the early
liberal mode of normative differentiation and correlate institutions, the
denial of the possibility of controversial grounds and results of the private
subtractions of ambiguities and opportunities of conflict (being such
denial, as discussed above, self-deception) is shifted to a ritualization, so
to speak, of "scientifically" generated knowledges and technical innova-
tions. At the same time, because they are seen to be associated with
religious or metaphysical concerns, the institutional harbors of "non-
scientific", "non-technical" normative determination characteristic of
early liberalism tend to be suppressed. Thus, for example, Comte attrib-
uted the prestige of the institutions of liberal politics to what he regarded
as a deplorable "constitutional metaphysics" which reduced "fundamen-
tal regeneration to a feeble universal imitation of the transitory constitu-
tion peculiar to England";30 while Bentham described as utter "nonsense"
the idea of natural right, celebrated in the 1791 French Declaration of the
Rights of Man.3' The "ritualization" of scientific method by means of
"positivism" was the way in which the denial of political essence was now
achieved, but with altogether different objective outcomes.
Indeed, the institutional practices which are sanctioned by this first line
of criticism are the "temporal dictatorships" the "panopticons", the
allegedly non-political, uncontroversial practices of technocratic social
engineering, as well as economic practices which constituted deviations
from the policies associated with classical political economy, and which
were provided "rational" explanations by theories of marginal utility
proposed by neo-classical economics.32 In such deviations, which were
meant as devices compensatory of perceived insufficiencies of existing
institutions, were included:
29. On the emergence of positivist social science, see generally H. Marcuse, Reason and
Revolution, (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1983) 323 et seq. On neo-classical
economics, see infra, note 32.
30. A. Comte, Cours de Philosophie Positive, quoted in R. Aron, Main Currents ofSociologi-
cal Thought, (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1968) at 305-306.
31. See J. Bentham, "Anarchical Fallacies - Being an Examination of the Declarations of
Rights Issued during the French Revolution", in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2
(Edinburgh: William Talt, 1843) at 489-534, 501.
32. On the theoretical foundations of neo-classical economics, see the account of the
"Jevonian Revolution" presented by Maurice Dobb in his Theories of Value andDistribution
since Adam Smith, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) at 166-210. See also J.
Schumpeter,-supra, note 27 at 909 et seq., and G. Myrdal, supra, note 23, at 80-103.
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(a) public regulation of hitherto privately conducted economic activity,
from factory legislation and antitrust laws to imperialist foreign
policies and protectionist tariffs;
(b) progressive or corrective taxation;
(c) public expenditure for social purposes; and
(d) the resort to central bank supervision in the control of money
market.33
At the legal-constitutional level, these compensatory devices corre-
sponded basically to an expansion of constitutional rights, so as to include
(paradoxically alongside, and not in stead of, the "natural" rights devised
earlier) claims that could not be pursued on the basis of exclusively
private normative differentiation, as occurred in the phase of early
liberalism. Rather, the fulfillment of the new rights depended on the
practicability of the compensatory devices mentioned above.
Thus, from its formulation in Robespierre's famous draft of the
Declaration of Rights of April 21, 1793, which filtered into the French
constitution of June 24, 1793, down to the end of World War I, the idea
became widely accepted and put into practice, that constitutions must
provide not only for the classical individual rights, but also for collective
or social rights.3 4 This implied, however, the objective availability, in
some measure, of institutions of civil government which did not entirely
rest on the early liberal credo of "natural" righteousness, but rather
depended on positive scientific knowledge.
In deep contradiction to this reform of the system of rights, the
parliamentary form of government-which, as conceived and functioning
under the natural rights-based "political equilibrium" doctrines of En-
glish-style constitutionalism, was the very practical embodiment of self-
deception - was generally maintained as a legal-constitutional model of
the political system.35 The explanatory and technical tools of neo-
33. These were policies described by Schumpeter as part of the sociopolitical background of
the period from 1870 to 1914. See J. Schumpeter, supra, note 27, at 766-771. The limits of the
innovative thrust of the new policies can be grasped in Schumpeter's remark about the decline
of the "serene confidence in laissez-faire", which had been characteristic of early liberalism.
Now, by contrast, "[e]conomic liberalism ... became riddled with qualifications that some-
times implied the surrender of its principles", ibid., at 761.
34. See B. Mirkine Guetz6vitch, Les Nouvelles Tendences du Droit Constitutionnel, (Paris:
Marcel Giard, 1931) at 35-44, 81-115.
35. According to Mirkine-Guetzfvitch, the build-up of tensions between the Executive and
Parliament (the renforcement de 'Executi), which was part of the characteristic tendency of
constitutional revisions in the interwarperiod in Europe, was the exception to the general model
of constitutional organization under parliamentarism. The doctrinal scheme remained that of
the Executive subjected to control by Parliament. This is at the bottom of what Mirkine-
Guetzdvitich described as the "rationalization of power" (rationalization du pouvoir) which
occured in the propagation and adaptation of English-style constitutionalism in the European
continent. Cf. Mirkine-Guetz~vich, supra note 34, at 166-183, 195-215. -
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classical economics provided convenient means for the late-liberal and
allegedly non-political adaptation of certain objectively available bu-
reaucratic capacities of the State to the management, for redirection, of
some of the consequences of self-deception under the old legal-constitu-
tional core of early liberal politics. An example of this can be found in the
introduction, by the marginalist economist Boehm-Bawerk, of progres-
sive income tax in Austria in the late nineteenth century.3 6
Finally, it should be mentioned that a variant of the positivist line of
criticism was developed which, while involving the ritualization, so to
speak, of its supposedly "scientific" and uncontroversial method, consti-
tuted predominantly a form of apology of the early liberal mode of
normative differentiation, since it did not focus or count upon the
objective availability of institutions of civil government capable of
implementing deviations from the early liberal recipe. This was the
"sociological tradition", 7 which in this respect parallelled the jurispru-
dential developments associated (a) with the conservative German
corporatist tradition, (b) with neo-scholastic French institutionalists, and
(c) in general with much of the doctrinal speculations of the school of
droit social.3
3. Criticism from the Left
There is a second major line of criticism of the early liberal mode of
normative differentiation. This line of criticism holds that the subtraction
of ambiguities and opportunities of conflict from the processes of cultural
and material production is largely involuntary or unconscious, and
independent from a conceived or experienced "natural" order. Private
normative differentiation is, in this view, irrational and therefore incapa-
ble of generating any stable objective institutional means of sociopoliti-
cal cohesion in the long run. Instead, it is argued, private normative
36. See J. Schumpeter, supra note 27, at 769. As noted by Schumpeter, "It is not only that
leading academic authorities, such as Marshall, began to approve of what was considered high
direct taxation - including inheritance taxes - but also that they began to espouse what was a
mortal sin against the spirit of Gladstonian finance, namely, a policy that went beyond taxing
for revenue only and aimed at taxing in order to change ("correct") income distribution", ibid.,
at 945.
37. See R. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New York: Basic Books, 1966). Nisbet's
survey of nineteenth-century sociology serves to underscore the point that the authors of that
tradition were unable, in their criticism of modem society, to appeal to, or conceive of,
alternatives to tradition or conservative morality.
38. On the German corporatist tradition, see R. Bowen, German Theories ofthe.Corporative
State (New York: McGraw Hill, 1947). Relevant works of French institutionalists are
presented in edited form in A. Broderick, ed. The French Institutionalists (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1970). On the school of droit social, see G. Gurvich, L'Idie du Droit Social,
(Paris: Librairie du Recueuil Sirey, 1932).
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differentiation, because largely independent from consciousness and
conscious action, is bound to cause deep objective contradictions, and is
therefore historically self-destructive. This is the view championed by
Marxism, and appears, although quite ambivalently, throughout Marx's
works.
The ambivalence of the Marxist criticism of liberal normative differ-
entiation stems from the following characteristic of Marx's thought. In
Marx's early works, emphasis is given to Hegelian themes of ideal
subjectivity.39 To this thematic emphasis may be attributed Marx's re-
quirements of self-consciousness of human activities. But in Marx's
mature works,40 the emphasis is turned to themes of political economy,
where self-consciousness, while still a requirement for Marx, is rather
noted for its absence in economic terms. One instance of this materialistic
criticism of the liberal mode of normative differentiation is formulated in
Marx's famous description of his critique of political economy:
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations
that are indispensible and independent of their will, relations of
production which correspond to a definite stage of development of
their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real
foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to
which correspond definite forms of social consciousness ... At a
certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of
society come in conflict with the existing relations of production...
Then begins an epoch of revolution. 4'
Another formulation of this same criticism is the theory of value Marx
advanced in Capital.42 By restating central tenets of political economy
and criticising them, Marx could offer a critical account of economic
exchange, which, as a principle of modem social interaction, necessarily
involved a ritualization, so to speak, of its own processes, expressed in
Marx's proposed "fetishism of commodity". 43 The concept of fetishism
of commodity, as much else in Marx's work, offers rich grounds for the
development of self-criticism. In general, self-criticism has been pursued
39. See, e.g., K. Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970).
40. The question of the relationship between the earlier and the later portions of Marx's work,
and therefore also of the interpretationof Marx's thoughtas awholeby referenceto a proposed
theoretical division or continuity in Marx's writings, has given rise, as is well known, to an
extensive debate. See L. Kolakowski, 1 Main Currents ofMarxism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1987) at 262-263.
41. K. Marx, Preface toA Contribution to the Critique ofPolitical Economy, in RobertTucker,
ed. The Marx-Engels Reader, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), at 3-6, 4-5.
42. K. Marx, 1 Capital, (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
43. Ibid., at 163-177.
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in the context of works that tend to converge with the third line of criticism
of the liberal mode of normative differentiation, as will be discussed later.
What should be stressed at this point is that the Marxist line of criticism
can involve (and indeed has often involved) the theoretical core concep-
tions and difficulties of historical materialism, for Marx's mature work
may also be read as claiming, or aspiring to, the attainment of positive
objectivity, as a cure for private normative differentiation occuring under
liberal theories and institutions.
Indeed, the conception of Marxism as a positive, empirical science,
capable of offering uncontroversial knowledge of history and society, has
been often espoused by Marxist writers and politicians, from Engels and
Kautsky to Lenin and Bukharin.44 The critique of the liberal mode of
normative differentiation and liberal institutions based on such interpre-
tation of Marx's works thus tends to follow much of the late-liberal,
positivist line of criticism described above, often leading to comparable
diagnoses of institutional wrongs and prospective alternatives: the sub-
stitution of party rule and tendentially uncontroversial technocratic
central planning for what is perceived to be a superstructural masquerade
of false ideas and deceiving practices concerning the material processes
of societal interaction (the counterparts to Comte's "constitutional meta-
physics" or to Bentham's similar dislikes for the old liberal legal and
political philosophies and practices). In this, exclusive theoretical props
of historical materialism are resorted to, which point in the direction of
a ritualization, so to speak, of the objective inevitability of the materialist
interpretation and predictions of history, which were, if nothing else,
imposed as orthodoxy by party discipline. The resulting lack of self-
criticism has been a Marxist form of self-deception, which is also
conducive to the denial of the political essence of society.
There are, however, other ways of interpreting the works of Marx
which neither stress themes of absolute ideal subjectivity nor rely on
deterministic materialism. Specifically as a line of criticism of the liberal
mode of normative differentiation, the theories which propose concep-
tions of the superstructure as being relatively autonomous from economi-
cally determined relations present interesting attempts to undermine the
self-deception which breeds under the "deterministic" interpretations of
Marx. 45 Indeed, State-centered analyses such as those advanced by
44. Cf. G. Lichtheim, Marxism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961) at 234-277,
325-351.
45. For an instructive interpretation of the crisis of "deterministic" Marxism, see E. Laclau &
C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, (London: Verso, 1985).
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Althusser, Poulantzas, Offe and Skocpo 4 6 constitute some of the exam-
ples of attempts to avoid the trappings of self-deception characteristic of
deterministic Marxism. For such alternative analyses tend to inquire into
the existence of objective institutions which are not posited by economic
presuppositions (self-defined as "scientific", uncriticizable truths). In
other words, such alternative analyses are conceived not to be entirely
determined by a scientifically ascertainable economic base, but they are
also understood to have definite relationships with the subjective processes
occurring in the society and existing in the immediate experience as
objective political practices and social relations.
Indeed, the interesting aspect of these works is that they tend to require
that themes which are usually tucked away from emancipatory criticism
- and ensconced under the presuppositions of "naturalness" of liberal
rights, "absoluteness" of classical economic value, and uncriticizable
"scientificity" of positivist social and economic science, and determinis-
tic historical materialism -be made available for scrutiny." But this begs
the question: scrutiny in the name of which values or authorities? As
pointed by Jessop, one of the features of such State-centered studies is
their understanding that the conceptual significance of the State "cannot
be determined a priori, but depend[s] .... on conjunctural analyses" 8 In
other words, the acceptability of the knowledges generated under the
State-centered studies rests on certain generalizations of empirical facts
which depart from received orthodoxies about the social functions
explanatory of the State (and hence of politics) in conventional social
science. But this would scarcely seem possible if such functions explana-
tory of the State and politics would correspond in fact to early and late
liberal, self-deceptive propositions. The answer to the question raised
seems to be then that State-centered studies only make sense because they
are practically inscribed in the context of, and therefore as intellectual
enterprises benefit from, the conditions of the "new constitutionalism",
under which ambiguities and opportunities of conflict afforded by the
legal constitutional framework do in the last instance prevail, including
with respect to the elaboration of "scientific" knowledge, as will be
described later.49
46. See L. Althusser, ForMarx, (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); id.Lenin andPhilosophy
and Other Essays, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971); N. Poulantzas, State, Power,
Socialism, (London: Verso, 1980); C. Offe, "Theses on the Theory of the State", in id.,
Contradictions ofthe Welfare State, (Cambridge: MITPress, 1985) at 119-129; T. R. Skocpol,
"Introduction" in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer and Theda R. Skocpol, eds. Bringing the
State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985) at 3-43.
47. For a survey of the State-centered analyses referred in the text, see B. Jessop, "Recent
theories of the capitalist state", in (1977) 1 Cambridge Journal of Economics 353-373.
48. Ibid., at 356.
49. See infra, Parts III and IV.
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The development of the claims of this strand of Marxist analysis tend
to converge with the views proposed by a third line of criticism of the
liberal mode of normative differentiation discussed below. But before
turning to that discussion, a word must be said about the practical side of
the Marxist line of criticism oftheliberal mode of normative differentiation.
The historical experiments which in this century have been enacted as
the "socialist" round of intellectual and material innovations have in-
volved no major reformulations of institutions of civil government.
Indeed, for the sake of revolution, there was no experimentation with the
legacy of liberal constitutionalism. There was, instead, experimentation
.with the mixing of wanton party-based despotism with technocracy, most
often in the name of a deferred post-revolutionary future. Thus the
leading socialist historical experiments in economic centralization (so-
cialist planning) and party rule have led to results which, as a whole, can
hardly be considered preferable to those obtained in the industrialized
societies of the West, since, as totalitarian practices, they have obviously
foreclosed self-criticism and emancipation to a much greater extent than
that which would seem possible or conceivable under the institutions
grown in the tradition of liberalism.
This claim, however, would be at odds with the contentions of the third
line of criticism of the liberal mode of normative differentiation. The third
line of criticism understands that the first round of innovations brought
by the liberal revolutions, together with the late-liberal deviations from
the initially defined knowledges and prescribed institutions, have already
by themselves originated a world of totalitarian oppression.
4. A Third Vantage Point? Toward a "New Constitutionalism"
Indeed, the third line of criticism of the liberal mode of normative
differentiation postulates that the private subtraction of higher-impact
ambiguities and opportunities of conflict from the processes of societal
interaction is ordinarily foreclosed under modem institutions. Thus,
according to the third line of criticism, the institutions that have emerged
from the liberal revolutions and their modifications by subsequent
positivist criticism are ordinarily completely objective. This is the postu-
late of comprehensive objectivity of institutions. But it is also argued that
such institutions are capable of being directed toward the promotion of
certain ends. These may include, and be limited to, the stabilization of the
fundamental societal and statal processes that sustain the status quo.
However, the ends may also be incompatible with the current order. The
argument is, in other words, that the general ends of human action are
rationally "unknown", being therefore in this sense "unreasoned" ends.
Consequently, reliance on objective institutions is unavoidable and may
either sustain or conflict with established social reality.
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The third line of criticism may therefore be developed either in an
apologetic, or in an actively innovative direction. In the latter case it may
be said to follow, and in the former to let go unfulfilled, the requirement
of emancipatory criticism. The third line of criticism of liberal normative
differentiation is mainly associated with Weberian social science, includ-
ing much of the work of Frankfurt School theorists, and with Keynesian
economics. These contributions will be discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Weber's analyses of modem society differ sharply from those ad-
vanced in both the first (positivist) and the second (Marxist) lines of
criticism of the liberal mode of normative differentiation. The whole
work of Weber can indeed be understood as the product of a continuous
effort to distinguish his views from those of each of the lines of criticism
mentioned above. Thus in his discussion on scientific method, for
example, Weber distinguishes empirical judgements of fact from judge-
ments of value, while also insisting that any scientific ascertainment of
empirical knowledge necessarily involves value suppositions which
neither stand on their own as absolutes nor are determined by empirical
or economic factors." Therefore, without yielding to commitments to
absolute ideals, Weber's views on method also reject the uncritical
acceptance of scientifically generated knowledge, either in its manifes-
tation as a positivist stance, such as that of the first line of criticism
described above, or in its formulation as deterministic Marxism. But
Weber's rejection of the materialist conception of history in his sociologi-
cal writings is certainly more spectacular than that articulated through his
discussions on methodology. In fact, Weber's insistence on the impor-
tance of ideas, especially religion," in the explanation of the emergence
of modem society, stands as an impressive refutation of the materialist
conception of history.
What appears to .be Weber's central concern with regard to the
characterization of political rationality in the modem world is the notion
that comprehensive rational calculability, attained through modem legal-
bureaucratic institutions, has become a deeply ironic condition. The
sense of irony stems from the recognition that ultimate moral values
cannot be rationally determined as absolutes: they remain always
"unreasoned" ends. In other words, since for Weber modem rationality
is purely of a formal kind, no superior value or all-embracing conception
50. See M. Weber, Methodology of the Social Sciences, (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1958)
at 1-47, 68-71.
51. See M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, (New York, Scribner's
Sons, 1958).
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of order can be relied upon as a view which offers indisputable moral
reassurance, such as occurred previously under pre-modem institutions.
The modem world of rational calculability, built out of religious asceti-
cism, has tragically become, in Weber's famous phrase, an "iron cage"
from which humanity cannot escape.52
Weber's pessimism or sense of irony and his emphasis on formal
calculability as the principle of modem rationality was incorporated in
the work of the theorists of the Frankfurt School, who hoped to pursue a
theoretical agenda that would have definite normative import with
respect to concrete sociopolitical practice.53 While the early project of
Horkheimer's "critical theory", in seeking such practice-bound norma-
tive closure, turned to the role of the proletariat as the class-struggle
corollary of the materialist interpretation of history,54 the pessimistic,
ironic criticism of modem rational calculability was greatly stressed in
the general work of the group.55 Granted that the normative ambitions of
the Frankfurt School project has remained throughout the intellectual
career of the group, the fact that its thematic emphasis was made to
include concerns identified with Weberianism may well be considered as
indicative of what both perspectives (Marxism and Weberianism) share
in common.
Indeed, while in Marx's works there is a tension between the endeav-
our of criticizing Hegelian philosophy (ideal subjectivity) and that of
criticizing classical political economy (the material objectivity asso-
ciated with the classical conception of "exchange value"), in Weber a
comparable tension is implicit in the conflicting claims that (a) the
modem world is organized on the basis of purely formal calculability, and
that (b) the institutions through which formal calculation is accomplished
have become the fetters of humanity. 56 If the Hegelian-Marxian ideal
subjectivity of self-consciousness and its Weberian counterpart, the
principle of required calculability, are bluntly rejected, then a relapse into
pre-mo dem ritualized conduct may result (and it is here that Weberianism
raises its ironic stance as a call for emancipation, and that Marxism claims
52. Ibid., at 155-183, 181-82.
53. On the normative ambitions of the Frankfurt School theorists, see M. Jay, The Dialectical
Imagination, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) at 3-5,41-42.
54. See M. Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory" in Critical Theory, (New York:
Continuum. 1982) at 188-243.
55. Cf. D. Kellner, "Critical Theory, Max Weber and the Dialectics of Domination", in R.
Antonio & R. Glassman, eds. A Weber-Marx Dialogue, (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1985) at 89-116.
56. On the relationship between the thought of Weber and that of Marx, see the essay by K.
Loewith, Max Weber and Karl Marx, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982). Loewith
suggests that the vital impulse which animated the intellectual efforts of both Marx and Weber
was "something akin to human emancipation", ibid., at 22 and passim.
426 The Dalhousie Law Journal
to offer an alternative direction of thought and action). On the other hand,
if the Marxist criticism of political economy and its Weberian counter-
part, the ironic, pessimistic appraisal of modem institutions, are set aside,
then either (a) the naive acceptance, and hence repressive imposition, of
the objectivity of empirical facts (status quo), and (b) themes related to
absolute ideal self-consciousness may arise. It is important to stress that
Weber does not yield to traditionalisms or moral-religious collectivisms,
as do, for example Durkheim or Tocqueville5 7 Thus the combination of
the postulate of comprehensive objectivity of institutions and the perva-
sive sense of irony seems to indicate that for Weber calculability should
be made to overlap with emancipation. Weber's conception of engaged
but "value-free" objectivity and his theory of charismatic leadership can
be understood as attempts to deal with this problematic aspect of his
thought.
It should furthermore be added that the third line of criticism of the
liberal mode of normative differentiation has also received significant
impetus from the rise of Nietzscheanism, or modem irrationalism. In a
broad sense, Nietzscheanism is the enthronement of the unreason inher-
ent in the rationally calculated world which results from private norma-
tive differentiation. It is the unyielding and incorrigible experiencing of
such unreason as the primary source of self-understanding. 8 Indeed, the
Weberian sense of irony, which appears also in Weber's thesis of the
"disenchantment" of the world, is not completely disconnected from the
Nietzschean drive to overcome subjectivity, as the reference to Nietzsche
in Weber's "Science as a Vocation" indicates.59 Nietzscheanism ex-"
presses the idea that the liberal revolutions quickly generated a world in
which rational calculation encountered and recognized its limits. With
Nietzscheanism, rationality can no longer be purely conceptual, as it had
57. See Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution, (Garden City:
Doubleday, 1955) especially xiii and 108-120; and Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms
of the Religious Life, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1915) at 415-447.
58. Nietzscheanism, in the sense the word is employed here, is synonimous with "modem
irrationalism", and translates generally into the works of the so-called Lebensphilosophen, or
"vitalist" philosophers. Cf. G. Lukacs, The Destruction of Reason, (Atlantic Highlands:
Humanities Press, 1981), where a sweeping criticism of the "vitalist" philosophers (among
whom Lukacs includes Weber and the pragmatists, represented by William James) is offered
from a Marxist perspective.
59. "Since Nietzsche we realize that something can bebeautiful, not only in spite of the aspect
in which it is not good, but rather in that very aspect. You will find this expressed earlier in The
fleurs du mal, as Baudelaire named his volume of poems. It is commonplace to observe that
something may be true, although it is not holy or not good. Indeed it may be true on precisely
those aspects. But all these are only the more elementary cases of the struggle that the gods of
the various orders are engaged in": M. Weber, "Science as a Vocation", in Max Weber on
Charisma and Institution Building, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1958) at 294-309,
308.
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been until Hegel. This is translated in the Marxist slogans on the primacy
of experience over philosophy," in the Erlebnis of phenomenology,6 in
the Weberian sense of irony, and it was brought to a sort of culmination
in Nietzsche.
On the practical side, the third line of criticism of the liberal mode of
normative differentiation has corresponded eventually62 to the develop-
ment of the full-fledged welfare state, including, in many societies,
economic planning,63 based chiefly on a new constitutional tolerance wih
regard to expanded normative competence and autonomy of administra-
tion (as opposed to parliamentary legislation and dispensation of liberal
justice) and on policies associated with Keynesian economics.4From the
juridical point of view, as will be seen later, the novel institutional
practices may described as a "new constitutionalism".
Under Keynesianism and the new constitutionalism, what were mere
"compensatory devices", accounted forby the theoretical instrumentalities
of neo-classical economics, win the chance to become the practical stuff
of centrally and formally controlled, but (as regards substance) politically
ambiguous, policy innovation initiatives. This has involved mainly the
abandonment of the three sacred canons of politicoeconomic practices,
which still had not been displaced by the late-liberal criticism of the early
liberal legacy. These canons were (a) the English-style constitutional
government, (b) the balanced budget, and (c) the gold standard. English-
style constitutionalism has been superseded by internally polarized
governments and in-flux systems of rights, the balanced budget by deficit
spending, and the gold standard by the Bretton Woods framework. The
aspects of these developments relevant for the present discussion will be
addressed in the paragraphs that follow.
Keynesian economics can be broadly viewed as the form of economic
analysis and policy-making which understands that (a) the adopted forms
60. See, e.g., Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach, in The Marx-Engels Reader, supra note 40,
at 143-145.
61. See Edmund Husserl, Ideas, passim (New York: Collier Books, 1962).
62. After the overcoming of the terrifying experiences under national socialism and fascism.
63. See Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) at
71-236.
64. The terms "Keynesianism" and "Keynesian economics" are employed expansively in this
article. They designate not only the ideas pulled together in John Maynard Keynes' General
Theory ofEmploymentInterestandMoney, (London: Macmillan, 1936), but also in general the
attitudes and looser conceptions that informed policy-making for which the works of Keynes
(or at least the practical directions of macroeconomic management to which they pointed)
remained important formal references, inspite of the existence of other strands of economic
thought (notably the German "social-market economy" doctrine). For relevant discussions of
the influence of Keynes' ideas, see works by various authors collected in Peter Hall, ed. The
Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989).
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of socioeconomic interaction cannot be considered as the mere result of
the private normative differentiation occuring in the society, which as
such is conducive to inefficiencies and above all to "involuntary unem-
ployment"; and that (b) objectively available institutions (namely, public
bureaucratic capacities) may be relied upon or developed in order to
promote desirable goals not fulfilled under current knowledges and
practices.
Therefore, at a general level, Keynesian economics adheres both to the
postulate of comprehensive objectivity of institutions and to the claim
that objective institutions may or must be criticized and reformed.
Keynes indeed expressed ideas along these lines in his famous essay
against the liberal credo of laissez-faire:
It is not true that individuals possess a prescriptive 'natural liberty' in
their economic activities. There is no 'compact' conferring perpetual
rights on those who Have and on those who Acquire. The world is not
so managed from above that private and social interest always
coincide. It is not so managed here below that in practice they
coincide. It is not a correct deduction from the Principles of Econom-
ics that enlightened self-interest always operates in the public interest.
Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened .... We
cannot, therefore, settle on abstract grounds, but must handle on its
merits in detail what Burke termed 'one of the finest problems of
legislation, namely, to determine what the State ought to take upon
itself to direct by public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as
little interference as possible, to individual exertion.'
65
As is apparent in the above text, Keynesianism abandons all possibility
of naive reliance on the liberal mode of normative differentiation and
advocates the resort to objectively available institutions. But Keynesian
reformism can be concerned predominantly with the attainment of long-
lasting conditions of "equilibrium" growth or economic management,
under which devised forms of societal and statal interaction (economic
aggregates and their interrelationships) are conceived to be stabilized and
relatively insulated against emancipatory criticism or radical practical
change. This appears to be the case not only with the reduction of
Keynesian economics to the consensus formed in the economics profes-
sion as to the policy implications of Keynes' works,66 but also with post-
Keynesian debates about the explanation of stable economic growth in
65. J. M. Keynes, "The End of Laissez-faire", in Essays in Persuasion, (London: Macmillan,
1972), at 272-294, 287-288 emphasis in original.
66. See, e.g., Hansen's summary of the prescribed "many-sided" attack on inflation: "1.
Judicious use of monetary policy. Moderate control of the use of credit. 2. Fiscal policy -
maintenance of high taxes, scrutiny of expenditures and postponment of all capital outlays not
justified on strong grounds of national policy ... 3. In addition to the judicious use of monetary
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macroeconomic terms.67 If it can be agreed that the particular positions
within post-Keynesian economics vary with respect to how the problem
of the uncertainty of future expectations (which had been stressed by
Keynes) is dealt with,6 then itmustfollow that the theories which propose
models of stable growth or equilibrium without major qualifications can
be understood as attempts to downplay important discontinuities in the
constitution of economic aggregates and their interrelationships. They
can therefore yield knowledges which deceivingly depict society as a
larger compound of self-sustaining, self-regulated systems of interre-
lated practices not subject to major conceptual or practical discontinuities6 9
rooted in the political essence of society.
The theories which propose such self-sustaining macroeconomic
systems, although adhering to the postulate of comprehensive objectivity
of institutions (as far as they rely on economic models which relate
aggregates of forms of human interaction as objective totalities, e.g.,
"labor supply", "savings", "investment", "wage variations", "profit
variations", and so forth), are in fact self-deceptive, since they tend to
foreclose emancipatory criticism/reformism, which would presuppose a
more resolute willingness to incorporate substantive political issues into
the theorization of models and connected policy implications. Of course
policy and a firm use of fiscal policy, minimum direct controls ... Moderation and self-restraint
are essential for the survival of free democratic government", A. Hansen,Monetary Theory and
Fiscal Policy, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1949) at 166. Keynes himself did not provide a
systematic and detailed presentation of the policy implications of his economic ideas. The
"Concluding Notes on the Social Philosophy towards which the General Theory might lead"
are sketchy, as the title of the chapter itself indicates. SeeJ. M. Keynes. General Theory, supra,
note 63, at 372-384. Keynes discussed his views on policy in more detail in his occasional
writings, such as "Can Lloyd George Do It?", "The Economic Consequences of Mr. Church-
ill", and "The Means to Prosperity"; see J. M. Keynes, Essays in Persuasion, supra note 65,
at 86-125, 207-230, 335-366.
67. For a useful presentation of the relevant post-Keynesian theoretical currents, see Paul
Davidson, "Post Keynesian Economics", in D. Bell & I. Kristol, eds. The Crisis of Economic
Theory, (New York: Basic Books, 1981) at 151-173.
68. This is, in the words ofJ. Robinson, the distinguishing mark ofpost-Keynesian economics:
"When Keynes was writing The General Theory, his main difference from the school from
which he was struggling to escape lay in the recognition of the problem of effective demand,
which they ignored. It was for this reason that he put everyone from Ricardo to Pigou into one
category ... After the book was published, he drew the line differently. He saw that the main
distinction was that he recognized, and they ignored, the obvious fact that expectations of the
future are necessarily uncertain.- It is from this point that post-Keynesian theory takes off. The
recognition of uncertainty undermines the concept of equilibrium", J. Robinson, "Foreword"
in A. Eichner, ed. A Guide to Post-Keynesian Economics, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1978) at
xi-xxi, xi.
69. Cf. P. Davison, supra note 67.
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such incorporation of political issues must not, and probably cannot, take
the form of loose ideological speculations. It can, however, be articulated
as an enlarged ability to expose contradictions and discontinuities among
proposed economic analyses and correlate policy prescriptions, in view
of their disparate "political" (substantive) implications.
Another way of stressing the same point would be to say that, in such
proposed self-sustaining economic systems, the ironic pessimism of
Weberian sociology (or its Marxian counterpart) is missing, because it is
replaced by coherent but uncritical theoretical solutions which do not
reflect in a larger measure the conditions of the "new constitutionalism",
which, as will be seen later, require that discontinuous concepts, rooted
in an unstable pool of substantive motives comprising an "ideological
slack", be articulated as temporarily stabilized knowledges andinstitutions.
In sharp contrast to the conservative, uncritical Keynesian quest for
stable equilibrium or growth, stands the work of economists who adhere
not only to the postulate of comprehensive objectivity of institutions but
also to that of emancipatory criticism. The general thrust of this strand of
Keynesian (and post-Keynesian) economics - which in this aspect would
be comparable with the normative aspirations of the Marxist-Weberian
sociology of the Frankfurt School theorists - is the tendency to generate
knowledges and prescribed practices which can come to constitute
potentially emancipatory objective relations. To attempt to indicate the
extent to which post-Keynesian economics has succeeded in proposing
emancipatory knowledges (or policy prescriptions), or to attempt to
determine precisely which groups of post-Keynesian economists have
advanced more clearly in critical directions is of course beyond the scope
of the present discussion?0 It will suffice to consider that the break with
past economic orthodoxy broughtby economists such as Keynes, Kalecki7l
and the members of the so-called "Stockholm school"'72 have probably
provided the first practical-theoretical impulse of emancipatory criticism
of resilient ramparts of self-deception characteristic of the early-liberal
and late-liberal experiences, without, however, falling pray to self-
deception of the kind bred by deterministic Marxism. This impulse can
either be further developed and diversified, or be opposed, by subsequent
economic doctrines.
70. P. Davidson, supra note 67, provides a classification of the lines of post-Keynesian
economic theory, and names well-known representatives of each.
71. See, generally, G. Feiwell, The Intellectual Capital of Michal Kalecki (Knoxville:
University of Tenessee Press, 1975).
72. See, generally, B. Hanson. The Stockholm School and the Development of the Dynamic
Method (London: Croom Helm, 1982).
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Part m
1. The New Constitutionalism at Work
At the strictly legal-constitutional level, the innovations which are
associated with the third line of criticism of the liberal mode of normative
differentiation are, as indicated above, those of a "new constitutional-
ism". Such new constitutionalism is characterized by:
(a) the internal polarization of government (where administration and
parliament are in constant actual or potential opposition) due to the
increasing technical role acquired by the executive branch,73 which
unfolds in burgeoning expert bureaucracies whose activities and
relationships with private normative differentiation occurring in the
society are far from being articulated in a comprehensive fashion by
public or private law; and
(b) a constant and extensive undermining, by bureaucratic regulation,
including the "guiding influence"74 of monetary and fiscal policies,
of the system of liberal ("natural" plus "social") rights, which is
consequently pushed into a state of flux.
Both the internal polarization of government and the constant legal-
bureaucratic deformation of the system of rights (which thus becomes a
system of rights-in-flux, in which moreover the distinction between
individual and social rights becomes relativized) stem largely, it must be
conceded, from Keynesian policies.75 Such policies have built into the
novel constitutional practices a constant potential of subversion of the
established order, a potential which did not previously exist as an
instrumentally controllable condition, i.e., as a condition of objective
institutional availability to formal calculation in the Weberian sense.
Such built-in potential of subversion of the legal system as the
normative framework of society is expressed in the undertaking of
governmental actions aimed at preventing or reversing drastic downturns
or upswings in the economy, which links economic policy-making with
73. See, for the case of England, the study brought by I. Harden & N. Lewis, The Noble Lie:
The British Constitution and the Rule of Law (London: Hutchinson, 1986).
74. The expression is Keynes': "The State will have to exercise a guiding influence on the
propensity to consume partly through its scheme of taxation, partly by fixing the rate of interest,
and partly, perhaps, in other ways", J. M. Keynes, The General Theory, supra note 64, at 378.
75. Before Keynesianism, the result of economic policy, under liberal institutions, was mass
unemployment, which has been a form of politicoeconomic retrenchment. Such retrenchment
was the result of the impossibility of sustained internal polarization of government and flux of
the system of rights beyond the point of materialization of the crise de confiance, the veto-
power of financial capital. An excellent example of such impossibility was the spectacular
failure of the so-called "Blum experiment", for an analysis of which, see reference infra note
97, 0. Kirchheimer, "Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise".
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ideological disputes that currently motivate social groups.76 These ideo-
logical disputes appear variously as discussions about the often conflict-
ing aspirations existing in the society as "institutionalized" or
"noninstitutionalized" interests. The former are those interests organized
around stabilized aggregates of resources, including more or less exclu-
sive channels of political negotiations with governmental bureaucra-
cies.77 On the other hand, noninstitutionalized interests are those which
fluctuate around inherently ephemeral but unsettling thematic cam-
paigns, such as in environmentalist, feminist, or pacifist movements, and
in populist appeals.7" In the process of dispute, concrete practices indi-
rectly related to the inflation rate,79 the institutional structure of markets80
and of capital, to standards of professional conduct," and therefore in
general also to the production of knowledge, and to the elaboration of
standards of taste and righteousness are, on different occasions and in
different degrees, brought into question.
This seems to be, in one way or another, what determines the decline
of currently stabilized aggregates of resources which define materially
crystalized interests (trade unions, corporations, governmental bureau-
cracies) constitutive of the status quo. The disputes and the political
tensions which grow and die away, or result in emancipatory reform, are
only possible because of the internal polarization of civil government
combined with the undermining and relative flux of the system of rights.
The new constitutionalism therefore stimulates the expansion of
practice-bound ideological speculation (which approximates, and tends
to converge with, economic or business-type speculation) as part of the
76. For an assessment of the connections between the economy and the politics of contempo-
rary industrial democracies, see D. Hibbs, Jr., The Political Economy of Industrial Democra-
cies, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987).
77. See, e.g., A. Shonfield, supra note 63, at 128-129.
78. On the relevance of fluctuating, "noninstitutional" social movements in contemporary
politics, see C. Offe, "Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics: social movements
since the 1960s", in C. Maier, ed. Changing Boundaries of the Political, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987) at 63-105. See also the discussion of the tensions between
corporate and non corporate (i.e., institutionalized and noninstitutionalized) interests, see J.
Goldthorpe, "The End of Convergencw. Corporatist and Dualist Tendencies in Modem
Western Societies", in J. Goldthorpe, ed. Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) at 315-343.
79. Cf. L. Lindbeyg,"Models fio-DisfationProcess",L.Lindberg& C. Maier,eds.
The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation, (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1985) at 25-52, 27-30.
80. Including labor markets. Cf. K. Hinrichs, C. Offe & H. Wiesenthal, "Time, Money and
Welfare-State Capitalism", inJ. Keane, ed. Civil Society and the State, (London: Verso, 1988)
at 221-243.
81. See, e.g., P. Starr &.E. Immergut, "Health Care and the Boundaries of Politics" in
Changing Boundaries, supra note 78, at 221-254.
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"normal", i.e. ordinary, social experience afforded by the legal system
operating under the "guiding influence" of economic policy. However, at
the same time, it paradoxically frustrates the translation of such specula-
tion into meaningful practice.
The latter point can be understood if one considers that while in pre-
modem societies the possibility of innovation in thought and action
remained subject to constraints posed by tradition and theocracy, and
while after the liberal revolutions and the first two rounds of innovation
(positivist and "socialist"), such possibility remained either harnessed to
liberal law emanating from self-deceptive English-style constitutional-
ism or suppressed by totalitarian rule, in the "new constitutionalism", due
in part to the operation of economic policy, such constraints have been
significantly relaxed. As a result, a permanent ideological slack in the
society has been created, and, although it was simultaneously neutralized
by the so-called de-ideologization of postwar political parties82 (which
has thwarted translation of radical deviant speculation into policy out-
puts) it did, precisely in this form, become the required counterpart of the
internal polarization of government, which then has to be understood as
a counterpart to de-radicalized mass participation.8 3 Thus, previously
stabilized aggregates of resources, which define the interests and identi-
ties of institutionalized groups, are subjected to destabilizing pressures
derived from the flux of rights, but are seldom sufficient to generate
radical reforms.
However, in times of sustained politicoeconomic crisis, the ideologi-
cal slack existing in the society and the internal polarization of govem-
ment may become interrelated in practically and logically discontinuous
variations. Such logically and practically discontinuous interrelation-
ships, without being pegged to constraints related to ideas of "natural"
righteousness and correlate practices, nor being able to be contained
under positive law and regulations, generate the patterns of the political
business cycle, while modifying overtime and structure of those patterns,
as well as the content and political and social significance of important
aspects of the constitution: the current structure of internal polarization
of the institutions of civil government, and the current differentiation and
interrelationships of rights. Such discontinuities may lead to moments of
breakdown of economic policy brought by high inflation or high unem-
ployment or both.
82. See 0. Kirchheimer, "The Transformation of the Western European Party System", in J.
LaPalombara & M. Weiner, eds. Political Parties and Political Development, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966) at 177-200.
83. See C. Offe, "Competitive party democracy in the Keynesian welfare state", in C. Offe,
Contradictions of the Welfare State, supra note 46, at 179-206, 183-188.
434 The Dalhousie Law Journal
It is difficult to identify the exact points in time when the transition
from English-style constitutionalism to the new constitutionalism oc-
curred in the diverse Western industrial democracies. But Lord Hewart's
New Despotism, which in 1929 denounced the expansion of administra-
tive discretion in England, 84 and which later merged with wartime
controls and with Keynesian prescriptions in the elaboration of the 1941
budget,85 Franklin Rooselvelt's 1944 "second Bill of Rights", 6 and de
Gaulle's program to build a polity in which "the executive power does not
proceed from the legislature, not even by a devious path, which would
inevitably be that of abuses and hagglings" 87 are unmistakable indications
of it. The French constitution of 1958, which incorporated the constitu-
tional ideas of General de Gaulle, has even been defined as "an unbal-
anced dyarchy, with indeterminate allocationof powers andresponsibili-
ties, bolstered by atechnostructure in constant growth".8 Similar language
was used in the United States, where a group of scholars, the 1937
President's Committee on Administrative Management, described inde-
pendent federal administrative agencies as forming "a headless fourth
branch of government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible and uncoor-
dinated powers". 89 Indeed, even the "constructive vote of no-confidence"
of the German Basic Law9" can be considered a formal feature belonging
to the new constitutionalism, since it allows for the exertion of power not
legitimized by a parliamentary majority.
Yet it must be conceded that the new constitutionalism has developed
more as a consequence of practices introduced from the economics
profession9' than from doctrines elaborated by jurists. In other words, the
84. Cf. J. F. Garner, "England", in E. V. Heyen, ed. Geschichte der Verwaltungsrechtswiss-
enschaft in Europa, (Frankfurt am Main: Vitorio Klostermann, 1982) at 21-66, 57.
85. Cf. P. Hall, Governing the Economy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 72.
86. Cf. C. Sunstein, "Constitutionalism After the New Deal", in (1987) 101 Harvard Law
Review 421-510 at 423.
87. C. de Gaulle, "Discours Prononc6 A Ltpinal", quoted in Marcel Pr61ot, Institutions
Politiques et Droit Constitutionnel, (Paris: Dalloz, 1987) at 620, my translation.
88. A. Hauriou & J. Giquel, Droit Constitutionnel etInstitutions Politiques, (Paris: tditions
Monchrestien, 1980) at 861, my translation.
89. The President's Committee on Administrative Management,AdministrativeManagement
in the UnitedStates (1937), quoted inJ. Landis, TheAdministrative Process, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1938) at 4.
90. See articles 67, 68 and 81 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Promulgated by the Parliamentary Council on 23 May 1949, in 5 A. Blaustein & G. H. Flanz,
eds., Constitutions of the Countries of the World, (New York; Oceana Publications, 1985).
91. On the propagation of Keynesianism, cf. A. 0. Hirschman, "How the Keynesian Revolu-
tion was Exported from the United States, and Other Comments", in The Political Power,
supra, note 24, at 347-359.
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new constitutionalism has emerged without any explictly revised juris-
prudential basis radically discrepant from early- and late-liberal propos-
als. Thus the round of intellectual innovations corresponding to the third
line of criticism of the liberal mode of normative differentiation and of
liberal institutions has not been completed in the field of jurisprudential
debate, if it may at all be considered to have progressed to an articulate
stage of structured controversy. The most ambitious, though still insuf-
ficient, efforts of recent legal theory-building have resulted in two main
theoretical tendencies, which can be described as follows.
On the one hand, there is the tendency to theorize about legal institu-
tions as self-sustaining "equilibrium" systems. In this first tendency can
be inscribed the Law & Economics approach,92 and the facile legal
sociologisms - based on capacious functionalist generalizations93 - of
writers such as Daintith and Teubner.94 On the other hand, there is the
tendency to criticize such equilibrium systems theorizations, a task
usually pursued by critical legal scholars.95
The result of the development of these theoretical tendencies seems to
be very simple. On the one hand, under the new constitutionalism,
conservative jurists side with conservative technocrats96 and exchange
knowledges and expertise with them in the task of ensuring that only the
narrowest range of variation from the old liberal institutional core is
allowed to take place. This has no destabilizing effect on the mainstays
of power which define the status quo. On the other hand, reformist jurists
may be encouraged to search for emancipatory knowledges, practices and
92. The Law & Economics approach follows the model of R. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986).
93. See, e.g., N. Luhmann, The Differentiation of Society, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982).
94. This line of legal sociology has produced quite an extensive literature. For relevant
materials and references, see T. Daintith, Law as an Instrument of Economic Policy:
Comparative and Critical Approaches, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988); G. Teubner, ed.,
Juridification of Social Spheres, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987); and G. Teubner, ed.,
Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985).
95. Critical legal literature, which has been produced mainly by American legal scholars, is
theoretically unorganized and diversified. Well-known, though partial, bibliographies are
D. Kennedy & K. Kare, "A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies", in (1984) 94 Yale Law
Journal461 and V. Wise,"OfLizards, IntersubjectiveZap and the Librarian", in(1988) 8 Legal
Reference Services Quarterly 1-27. For an instructive comparison of this American literature
with its German counterpart, see C. Joerges, "Politische Rechtstheorie and Critical Legal
Studies: Points of Contact and Divergencies", in C. Joerges & D. Trubek, eds., Critical Legal
Thought: An American-German Debate, 597-643 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989).
96. Cf. complaints brought by Andr6-Jean Amaud, Les Juristes Face d la Socital, (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1975) at 198,205; and by L. Tribe, "Policy Science: Analysis
or Ideology?", in (1972) 2 Philosophy & Public Affairs, 66-110.
436 The Dalhousie Law Journal
tensions, to be introduced from politics (the on-going ideological debate)
into the legal system, with destabilizing intention, but still no correspond-
ing effectual force.
This limitation of legal criticism, namely, its lack of practical effec-
tiveness, stems from a defect of the political institutions and jurispruden-
tial notions which have come to us from the liberal legacy. Such defect
is the inability of legal discourse and professional practice to come to
grips with the political essence of society. This becomes clear in the
characterization of the fate of rationality in the new constitutionalism,
which is conducive to the formulation of the challenge of contemporary
constitutional theory.
2. Political Rationality in the New Constitutionalism
In the new constitutionalism, technocratic bureaucracies, from central
banks to transportation boards, by referring to the technical necessities
and truths which are scientifically (formally, mathematically) calculated,
are able to serve "the public interest" or to render "public services", and
spare the center of the formal constitutional system the difficult task of
justifying with purely formal concepts of constitutional law (or of
justifying under governmental practices carried out in the name of purely
formal concept of constitutional law) much of the public policies admin-
istered in response to the fluctuation of questioned meanings and norma-
tive claims. The rise of technocratic bureaucracies roughly since the mid-
1800s has therefore arguably contributed to political and social instability,
as reflected in the shifts of the confidence basis of the business cycle.
Under the legal-constitutional framework of the liberal polity, this
confidence basis and its drift coincided with the power and welfare of
established groups embodying institutionalized interests. Such coinci-
dence persisted until the interwar period, as was dramatically confirmed
by the failed "Blum experiment". 97 However, it was subsequently under-
mined since World War II, under the new constitutionalism as explained
below.
97. It was largely because the political components of the 1936 cisis were not the object of
technical development, through jurisprudence or through political economy ,that the Blum
experiment failed spectacularly. For a brief analysis of the political-financial aspects of the
crisis, see 0. Kirchheimer, "Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise", in A. Arato
& E. Ebhardt, eds., The Essential Frankfurt Reader, 49-70 (New York: Continuum, 1987).
Ironically, Blum was himself a distinguished jurist, who severely criticized liberal constitu-
tionalism, cf. L. Blum,LaRiforme Gouvernementale, 3rd ed. (Paris: Editions Bernard Grasset,
1936) at 150-151, 211-227. On Blum's reputation as a jurist, see J. Colton, Lion Blum,
Humanist in Politics, (Durham: Duke University, 1987) at 12-13.
Beyond Liberalism and Its Critics: An Essay in Constitutional Theory
In addressing present socioeconomic conditions, governments no
longer rely (at least no longer primarily nor exclusively) on the liberal
jurists' self-evident and all-embracing claims of natural righteousness,
nor on their notions of "fundamental (or higher) law" and of balance of
forces under the constitution. Nor do governments rely on formal legal
rules said to be devoid of any contingent substantive content, as was
proposed by legal positivism. Instead, after the 1930s, governments have
developed methods to measure national income, GNP and unemploy-
ment, and to calculate the impact of taxation and public expenditure on
aggregate demand.98 These techniques of mathematical calculation are
used instrumentally, and independently of jurisprudential notions, to
articulate economic policies (supplemented by public policies based also
on calculated knowledge in the diverse areas of scientific expertise)
whose final practical outcomes, for unknown substantive reasons, do not
necessarily coincide, or do not coincide fully, with the expectations of
established groups.99 These policies therefore stimulate aggregate de-
mand based on ulterior speculative drives, that is, on motives of action
originally not comprehended in the social routines supported by the
exertion of economic power as distributed under existing law.
Once mathematically calculated knowledge, considered in its instru-
mental technocratic use, under demand-stimulus economic policies and
supplementary public policies, is recognized to be the result of ilcorpo-
rating the unknown into temporarily stabilized forms, then there arises an
awareness of the integration of the speculative sociopolitical dimension
of such knowledge into proposed normative standards. At a more general
level, this condition of economic policy and of public policy in general
is expressed in the idea that in mathematical procedure "the unknown
becomes [simply] the unknown quantity of an equation". 0
Such reduction of the unknown into known quantities acquired impor-
tant significance because Keynesian monetary policy is based on an
instrumental subversion of the "speculative motive"'' 1 of money-hold-
98. A. Heidenheimer, H. Heclo & C. Adams, Comparative Public Policy, (New York: St.
Martin Press, 1983) at 127.
99. In Kalecki's characterization: "Under a laissez-faire system, the level of employment
depends to a great extent on the so-called state of confidence. If this deteriorates, private
investment declines, which results in a fall of output and employment (both directly and
through the secondary effect of the fall in incomes upon consumption and investment) ... But
once the Government learns the trick of increasing- employment by its own purchases, this
powerful controlling device loses its effectiveness ... The social function of 'sound finance'
is to make the level of employment dependent on the 'state of confidence"', M. Kalecki,
"Political Aspects of Full Employment", in (1943) 14 Political Quarterly 322-331., at 325.
100. M. Horkheimer&T. Adorno,DialecticofEnlightenment, (New York: Continuum, 1985)
at 24.
101. See J. M. Keynes, The General Theory, supra note 64, at 170-174, 194-209.
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ers, and because Keynesian fiscal policy does not serve any reasoned end
postulated as necessary. This couples with the inability of positive
science (which is produced under conditions of countercyclical deficit
spending, and which drives technocratic social engineering) to envisage
the substantive political dimension of its own foundations. Such dimen-
sion could gain a legal-doctrinal expression. Safety standards, which
inform public policy in the area of environmental protection are an
example in point.
Policy makers today are ready to acknowledge that "[s]cience and the
law are uneasy partners".10 2 The uneasy partnership of science and the law
stems from the fact that "[s]cience thrives on uncertainty ... [t]he best
young scientists flock into fields where great questions have been asked
but nothing is known". 103 When it serves as the basis of public policy,
therefore, scientific or mathematical calculation integrates non-formal
considerations (or eschewed opportunities of broad speculation) into
formal normative standards of socioeconomic interaction:
In assessing a suspected carcinogen, for example, there are uncertain-
ties at every point where an assumption must be made: in calculating
exposure; in extrapolating from high doses where we have seen an
effect to the low doses typical of environmental pollution; in what we
may expect when humans are subjected to much lower doses of a
substance that, when given in high doses, caused tumors in laboratory
animals; and finally in the very mechanisms by which we suppose the
disease to work. - One thing we clearly need to do is to ensure that our
laws reflect these scientific realities".'14
In assessing the risk inherent in the production or social use of a
hazardous substance, therefore, uncertainties and speculative opportuni-
ties abound. And those uncertainties and speculative opportunities are not
eliminated by scientific or mathematical calculation: they are simply
patched up by formal equations yielding formal and temporarily sustain-
able knowledge. The public policies articulated on the basis of such
knowledge therefore carry a suppressed or masked speculative compo-
nent that has "unknown" but definite political significance. That compo-
nent corresponds to the "political gap" in the knowledge generated by
positive science. No matter what apparatus of formal calculation is
employed, whether stochastic models in monetary policy or probabilistic
risk assessment in the regulation of nuclear safety, the problem of the
persistence of the unknown arises in the guise of questions such as that
102. W. Ruckelhaus, "Science, Risk and Public Policy", in (1983) 221 Science 1026-1028 at
1026. Ruckelhaus was once Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid., at 1027.
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of knowing which is "the effect of uncertainty as to. the values of the
parameters of the model",105 or that of knowing whether "no [possible]
scenario has been left out",° 6 and so forth. There is also the distinct
problem, experienced by every specialist in any given field, that experts
"may [and do] disagree among themselves". °7
One can imagine that in the aggregate the "political gap" existing in the
knowledge generated by positive science tends to acquire special politi-
cal significance once it is understood that
(a) research and development, and science policy generally, which in
the new constitutionalism are necessarily sustained in a situation of
countercyclical tides of deficit spending, result in part from a fiscal
policy that does not serve any reasoned set of substantive ends, 108
yielding therefore "politically defective" knowledge;
(b) such politically defective knowledge becomes the basis of the
rationality of welfare agencies and other regulatory activities; and
(c) the accumulatibn of positive scientific knowledge and expertise in
certain "paradigmatic" directions and its absorption into the regula-
tory process sustains the formation of the preconditions of the
current patterns of production and investment."'
In these three elements combined lies the political significance of all
calculated knowledge. Such elements lead to the conclusion that self-
governance, or self-regulation, as a condition desired for socioeconomic
interaction, cannot, even if guided by extensive and elaborate formal
calculus, be sustained indefinitely, without episodes of self-contradiction
and irrational, self-destructive tendencies or crises. These correspond to
events of collapse of formal norms (and/or systems of quantitative
grounds of action, namely, prices) and vacuum of legitimate substantive
motivations at the level of the institutional foundations of established
practices. The argument that a capital market crash occurs due in part to
105. W. Poole, "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic*
Macro Model ", in (1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 197-215 at 215.
106. M. E. Pate-Cornell, "Risk Analysis and Relevance of Uncertainties in Nuclear Safeties
Decisions", in Elizabeth Bailey, ed., Public Regulation: New Perspectives on Institutions and
Policies, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987) at 227-253.
107. Ibid., at 238. On this point, see also infra, note 109.
108. In fact, the lack of substantive ends is a general characteristic of both monetary and fiscal
policy, and it underlies the whole Keynesian conception of political economy. This is
perceivable in Keynes' half-humorous and famous suggestion that theTreasury "fill old bottles
with bank-notes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coal-mines which are then filled up
with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well tried principles of laissez-faire to
dig the notes up again", J. M. Keynes, The General Theory, supra note 64, at 129.
109. In Offe's characterization, this corresponds to "administrative recommodification"
which is hooked up with the "scientization of politics". See, C. Offe, Contradictions of the
Welfare State, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984) at 123-125, 112-114.
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the lack of exogenous (governmental) regulation of the institutional rules
by which such markets exist as self-organized practices " serves to
illustrate this condition.
Part IV
1. The Challenge of Contemporary Constitutional Theory
What should be retained from the above discussion is that mathematical
procedures of calculation integrate uncertainties, as masked or sup-
pressed speculative components, in the formal body of understandings
offered as stable knowledge and rules of action.
The unknown, most of all the arcana imperii, which remained the
foundation of policy under pre-modern institutions,I' were said to have
ceased to exist in liberal or English-style constitutionalism. Indeed, the
rule of law presupposes private normative differentiation and universal
intelligibility and acceptance of norms (typically, "natural" rights), in
light of which the prince loses all extraordinary or superior powers. On
the other hand, universal intelligibility and acceptance of the grounds of
action was also a characteristic of the first two rounds of criticism
(postivist and socialist) of early liberalism. However, with the rise of
Keynesianism and, in general, of public policy based on scientific
calculation materially sustained by countercyclical tides of deficit spend-
ing and by instrumental subversion of the speculative motive of money-
holders, the unknown reappears, but this time as the masked or sup-
pressed speculative dimension of the formal apparatus of government,
which is ultimately the formal constitution itself. It was this reappearance
of political mystery that has opened the possibility that, in the new
constitutionalism, under the guidance of Keynesian economic policies,
the political essence of society be reinstated, and public affairs be
conducted, on the basis of calculi whose substantive implications may not
coincide with the views and interests of institutionalized groups. 1
But this condition may fail to win recognition by public authorities,
and self-conscious reinstatement of the political essence may be ham-
pered, if either the old liberal rights remain as a necessary normative
reference with untouchable validity (for example, in the cases of priva-
tization of normative power in the name of liberal rights), or if positive
science is allowed to stand apart from explicit political considerations,
110. See R. Karmel, "Securities Industry Self-Regulation - Tested by the Crash", in (1988),
45 Washington & Lee Law Review, 1297-1319.
111. Cf. John G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1975) at 28.
112. See supra ,notes 78 and 99 and accompanying text.
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i.e., apart from speculations concerning the desired directions of collec-
tive material and moral change. Such speculations are normally practiced
by any citizen moved by political (secular or religious) convictions.
Moreover, all such speculations are capable of generating coherent
systems of beliefs or speculative knowledge, such as in religion, in
metaphysics or even in political parties' programmes. But only those
speculations which are capable of generating the occurence of events of
collapse of form and vacuum of substance at a recognized constitutional
level, followed by temporarily stabilized formal, public rules (statutes,
judicial decisions, administrative rulings) do attain any emancipatory
practical significance.
The problem of the liberal constitution was that the substantive
dimension of the exercise of economic power, which is necessarily based
on conflicting speculative motivations constitutive of economic compe-
tition, remained beyond the reach of formal legal rationality. Thus
politically relevant collapses of formal norms occurred most often as
coups d'itat (e.g., eighteenth of Brumaire), revolutions (e.g., 1848 in
France), or as the result of war (e.g., the American "Civil War amend-
ments"; the French Third Republic). In such abrupt transitions, there was
no instrumental effort (apart from plebiscitarian leadership) orchestrated
in order to build institutional forms that embodied the self-contradictory
political essence of society.
Similarly, in the current industrial democracies, where the "new
constitutionalism" prevails, collapses of formal norms occur in a great
proportion as elusive policy shifts, at the periphery of the central govern-
ment, in the bureaucracies which administer their formal models of how
the world works. Moreover, much of the policy shifts occurring in the
technocratic bureaucracies of industrial democracies remain subject to
instrumentally effected but merely quantitative variations of
macroeconomic policy. Thus the constitutional relevance of the occur-
rence of events of collapse of form and vacuum of substance in the new
constitutionalism is diffuse, and the intelligence of their substantive
political significance is most often lost. Most of all, these policy shifts and
the modification of social routines which they entail are very imperfectly
linked, if at all, to political practices and to ideological debate, in which
the definitions of avenues and directions of historical change are collec-
tively fought over.
The challenge of contemporary constitutional theory is therefore
twofold. First, this challenge corresponds to the need to devise institu-
tions capable of transmitting to the center of the formal political system
(the formal constitution) the occurrence of events of collapse of form and
vacuum of substance of adopted norms and policies. This transmission
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must be such that the events of collapse of form and vacuum of substance
are made to gain expression in substantive doctrinal contradictions (as
opposed to mere quantitative notation in mathematical equations and
formal scientific models) which convey the chief political dilemmas and
conflicts in the society. Second, the challenge of contemporary constitu-
tional theory is that of turning such doctrinally articulated political
dilemmas and conflicts into effective preconditions of economic compe-
tition and exchange relations. This twofold challenge could be met by:
(a) the articulation of constitutional doctrine (in the narrow sense of
constitutional law) with political parties' programmatic and ideo-
logical concerns; and
(b) the "legal" derivation of monetary policy.
In other words, what is accomplished today merely by means of
quantitative variations of macroeconomic policies mustbeinstrumentally
connected with substantive contents juristically and explicitly formu-
lated as the self-conscious and self-contradictory political essence of
society, which then must be established as the effective ground of
economic action.
However, as seen above, the political essence of society was shunned
under the liberal constitution as well as under the positivist and "socialist"
experiments and directions of thought.
Thus the challenge of contemporary constitutional theory will be met
only where the doctrinal articulation of the formal constitution ventures
beyond liberalism and its critics. In other words, such challenge will be
met only where law and politics are economically and instrumentally
articulated in the service of goals definitely discrepant from any conceiv-
able natural right and from any existing body of positive law. This means
to say that, beyond liberalism and its critics, constitutional adjudication
must be capable of being conducted in instrumental articulation with the
ideological speculations channelled through radicalized political parties,
which must then be juristically translated into general grounds of eco-
nomic action irreducible to "natural" rights, to "compensatory devices"
of the kind proposed by the positivist criticism discussed earlier, or to
administrative regulations of the kind prevalent in socialist planning.
Indeed, adjudication must replace the conventional "law-finding"
activity (finding the "right answer", saying what the law is, etc.) by an
emancipatory "economic reform-finding" activity. This would culmi-
nate, not with the adjudicatory declaration of pre-existing natural rights
nor of pre-existing positive law (nor yet with the corroboration or
supplementation of administrative rule-setting), but with the granting of
economic entitlements which respond to political parties' mobilization
practices and programmatic commitments. Such economic entitlements
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would definitely have to be thought of as "illegal" in light of liberal
jurisprudence. In other words, they would have to be understood as
economic entitlements against established law, which law is always that
of institutionalized groups." 3 At bottom, therefore, they would constitute
means of support of "noninstitutionalized" experiments of political
engagement with an economic import constitutive of potential alternative
directions of investment, i.e., constitutive of emancipatory drives of
qualitative diversification of the marginal efficiency of capital. This
would imply the redistribution, not of wealth alone, but of economic
power itself. Such redistribution would have to rely on the "legal
derivation" of monetary policy, which could be accomplished as follows.
The economic entitlements against established law could be attached
to open market operations in which special government papers are bought
and sold. Such special government papers could be given long-run and
differentiated substantive political meanings corresponding to the pro-
grammatic proposals debated by political parties. They could be called
"public policy bonds", and be divided into different classes, possibly with
different yields, according to the different policy areas, such as "hous-
ing", "education", "urban planning", "environmental protection", "re-
search and development", "public health", "race relations", and so forth.
Thus the legal derivation of monetary policy would involve the prudential
attribution of positive constitutional value to certain political parties"
programmatic proposals, and adjudication whereby quantities of bonds
would be assigned to "politically" aggrieved persons. Such public policy
bonds would constitute the economic basis of the economic entitlements
"against the established law'". The entitlements would, in turn be an-
chored in legally derived monetary policy.
Thus, for example, a tenant that under the formal laws must be evicted,
but that according to ideological priorities established by political parties
should not be evicted, may in fact be legally evicted and at the same time
be granted an economic entitlement "against the established law", corre-
sponding to a certain amount of "housing policy bonds", sufficient to
provide for his or her housing needs, in the context of mobilization
practices related to, say, movements in support of urban renewal in a
given city district. This would have a corresponding effect in the interest
rate. Similarly, economic competition practices considered to be fair
under the law may be deemed unacceptable under ideological criteria
whose constitutional significance is juristically recognized and by virtue
of which a politically aggrieved party (a business or class of business in
113. The opponents of social transformation, as suggested by Machiavelli, always "have the
law on their side". See N. Machiavelli, supra note 13, at 30.
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a certain geographical area) may be granted an amount of "domestic trade
policy bonds", in the context of cooperative movements supported by
political parties, and again with an influence on the interest rate. The
examples could be multiplied.
The conventional procedures and criteria for the establishment of
monetary and fiscal policies would have to be revised, since both interest
rates and the means of financing the public deficit would affect the
constitutional role of the public policy bonds. However, the general result
of the new practices and institutions would be a much greater diversity of
possible patterns of legally endorsed collective action, obtained through
incomparably better means than the mere inflationary stimulation of
economic growth, or the mere quantitative "equalization" of the interest
rate with the marginal efficiency of capital.
